State of Utah v. Roy Lee Poe : Brief of Appellant by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1970 
State of Utah v. Roy Lee Poe : Brief of Appellant 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Joseph E. Jackson; Attorney for Appellant 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Poe, No. 11836 (1970). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4928 
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
. ,,,. 
.. 
't .\ " 
la the s.- 1." ... ' _·, . ', ·. . \ ' tf tile Stata.,;.··· ... 
. 
OJ' U"t4B, 
P1otttH# .. &Bllllill 
OF C'O:\TE:\TS 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE _ ------------·· 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT ------·--·· .. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ----------------------------·---
STATEMENT OF FACT 
FACTS RELEVANT TO 
THE COMPOSITION OF JURY __________ ----·-··--·· 
ARGUMENT-POINT I 
The trial court committed prejudicial error by refus-
ing to allow the defendant's counsel to determine by 
direct voire dire examination or by voire dire exami-
nation of the Court the answers to questions as to 
the religion and religious attitudes of the prospective 
jurors and also the method of selecting additional 
veniremen, thereby denying the defendant due process 
of law under the Constitution of the United States, 
Amendment XIV ------------------------ -----------------------------··---·· 
POINT II-The trial court committed prejudicial 
error by admission of testimony from prior trial ...... · 
POINT III-The trial court abused its discretion by 
admitting into evidence gruesome and gory pictures 
of the deceased when discovered with the inflamma-
tory nature and prejudicial effect of such photographs 
overshadowing any possible probative value with re-
spect to a fact in issue -------------------------------------------- ... ·· · 
POINT IV-The trial court committed prejudicial 
error by requiring the jury to retire and consider 
their verdict at such a late hour in the day and by 
refusing to allow the jury to be taken to an appropri-
ate and proper place to retire for the evening, to re-
turn the following day and continue their delibera-
tions ------------·······--------------------------------------------------------------········ 
POINT V-The cumulative effect of the foregoing 
errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial ----········· 
STATUTES 
Ut<th Code Annotated, 1953, Section 76-30-3 --····----····-···-·--1 
lJ tab Annotated, 1953, Section 77-28-1 ------·----------------- 11 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-46-23 ·----------------------- 11 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 77-44-3 -----····--·-··-------15 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (U .C.R.P.) 47 (g) -------------··· 11 
c\.U'l'HOHlTIES - TREATISES 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Evidence, Sec. 393 --------------··------·- 16 
Jones on Evidence, Sections 313, 314 ···········----------------·-······· 16
CASES 
Cowperthwaitc v. Jones, (Ct. Com. PI. Philadelphia) 
2 Dall. 55, 1 L. Ed. 287 ·---·-··------·--··-··--·-----------------------------21 
Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 
86 L. Ed. 680 --------·--·-----------·--····--·-·---···-------·-----------------------12-21 
Hanks v. Christiansen, 354 P. 2d 564, 11 Ut. 2d 8 ---------------- 23 
Long v. California-Western States Life Ins. Co., 
279 P. 2d 43, 43 C. 2d 871 ------------------------------------------------ 17 
People v. Carter, 364 P. 2d 4 77, 56 C. 2d 549 -------------------- 13 
People v. White, 278 P. 2d 9, 43 C. 2d 740 ------------------------ 13 
Remmer v. United States, 350 U. S. 377, 76 S. Ct. 425, 
100 L. Ed 435 ----------------------------····--·--·-----·-------·--------------------22 
State v. Cluff, 158 Pac. 705 ----------------------------------·--------------------- 12 
State v. Dodge, 365 P. 2d 798, 12 Ut. 2d 293 ----··-·---·--···--··--· 13 
State v. Kazda, 302 P. 2d 486, 15 Ut. 2d 313 -·--·--·--------·-··--·· 15 
State v. Poe, 441 P. 2d 512, 21 Ut. 2d 113 -··-····-----···-·-····· 19 
State v. Renzo, 443 P. 2d 392, 21 Ut. 2d 205 ·---··-··---·--·-···-··· 19 
State v. St. Clair, 282 P. 2d 323, 3 Ut. 2d 230 ------·---··---··-·· 24 
State v. Vasquez, 121 Pac. 903, 101 Utah 444 --·-··--··---·---····· 24 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 
20 L. Ed. 2d 776 ---------------------------------------------- -----------·-··-·-··· 10 
Xenakis v. Garrett Freight Lines, 265 P. 2d 1007, 
1 u t. 2d 299 ············-···----············----···-··---·--------·-·····-·····---------22 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, \) 
I1lai11tiff and Respondent, ( 
rn. ). Case No. 11836 
ROY LEE POE, 
Dcfrndant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Tltc appellant, Roy Lee Poe, appeals from his con-
1 il'tiou of Jlurrlr-r in the First Degree in violation of 
\'1dio11 76-30-!-J, rTtril1 Code Annotated, 1958, upon jury 
trial i11 the Fifth .Jnclicial District Court of Iron County, 
'ltatp of lTtali. The Honorable C. Nelson Day presided, 
<111il tlw ay1pe llant \rn.s sentcnC'ed to life imprisonment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
'I'l1l! appc•llaiit was charg·e<l with the crime of murder 
11 tii" fir"t 11y information filed in the District 
1 "n1rt of th(' Fifth .fodicial District, ·washington County, 
'-'l:itr· ()j' rta]i. }-fr, \\"HS first arrai,'!,'nCd on ,January 14, 
10GG, and entered a plea of ''not guilt:'-'' Trial Ji! · 
was commenced in the first action on 28, 1%(i 
cone l uclecl ,:\ pril 1, HJ(j(). presentation of (•ri1lii: 
the appl'llant \•;as fonrnl d' nrnnlc1· in tlil' Ji:-
dcgree and, the .inn· in thos0 proceedings haYin:.; 111.1. 
no recommendation for mere:·. the IIonornble C. X1·l" 
Da:·, District Court J udgc, e11ter0cl .inclgment up011 1; 
\·0rclict arnl sentenced the appellant to clcath h:· shr1qti1. 
at the Utah State Prison. The appdlant was committ 
to the Utah State Prison on April 18, HJGG, to mn1it ''· 
ecutio11. 011 ?II a:· 10, l!!<iG, .T nc1µ:c Day orclen•cl a ,1 
of execution pending appe;;] to the lT tah Supremc> ('011! 
The Utah Supreme Court on the 4th cla:· of .Tml(', 1:11. 
re\·crscd the decision of the lower conrt and rcman1l1 
the case hack to the 1'"'ifth Judicial Court, 
Connt:·, State of Utah, for a new trial. 
The appellant filecl varions motions "·ith the 11i· 
trict Conrt in and for \Yashington County, f.ltnti> ' 
Utah, rec1uestin'" a clrnn'_"e of from l':"°'I 
County. The District Conrt considered the 1'1 
deuce and testimo11:· addnced at the hearinµ;s on tlir r' 
quest for the change of Yenue and the Court entcrr1l ;i 
order ch an o·ino· the \·enne from \Ya shin ()'ton ConntY, n . 
to Iron Count:·, Utah. The trial commenced on the L' 
da:· of ?lfa:-. 1%0 ancl conrlm'.ecl on the 20th cla:· of 'If:· 
1969. After prosentation of the oYiclence the appclla' 
was found p;nilt:· of mnnlor in thr first de[!,Teo pro1·iil•· 
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li11\\·(•\·e1', the j11r)' macle a recommendation for mercy . 
. 111d'..!e l'. X<>lson Day entered the judgment upon the ver-
rlil't and seutPnce<l the appellant to life imprisonment. 
Tlw appellnnt \\'as committed to the Utah State Prison on 
1li1• (by of ;\fay, 1969. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
'l'lw appellant suhmits that the conviction should be 
r1•\·1·rsPd, and that a new trial be granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
The following is a summary of the evidence offered 
at trial. Mr. Kenneth Hall was shot twice through the 
liL·<Hl by a firearm, presumably a .22 calibre rifle. (Tr . 
.J..+O). The bocly of the deceased was found late in the 
afternoon of November 9, 1965, when his brother, Le-
l:tn!l Hall, obtained access to the deceased 's home near 
Grorge, Utah, by breaking into said home (Tr. 190). 
Th<' dec>eased was found on his back, his arms crossed, 
one arm over the other and situated on the upper por-
liou of his body (Tr. 191). Leland Hall identified the 
l111(ly as that of his brother, Kenneth Hall. Leland Hall 
!11rthl'l' trstifie<l that Kenneth Hall had been a resident 
'.._, ' 11 t (1rorge for some years. 
Yarions inn'stigating authorities commenced an in-
r,1i.'-'.ation aml a search of the deceased's home on the 
!11 th of :\ovember. The local peace officers were 
•111 l1·d 11.\· Lt. C'larrncc• Salt Lakr Sheriff's 
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Office, awl Capt. Ferris ..L\.m1rns, Lake County 
iff 's Office. Capt. ..L\.ndru:-; testified that there \Iii 
fingerprinb taken and Lt. Clare1we Enms testifo·d tlr. 
there were not any fingerprints taken. Numerous pho11 
graphs of the area were taken. rrhe photograpb i1, 
eluded the outside portions of the house, the inside !J11: 
tions of the house and the general area around the hm:· 
of the deceased (Tr. -!G2-500). 
The deceased 's body was taken from the home an 
transported to Utah Valley Hospital in Provo, l't:1 
(Tr. -!05-510). Dr. \\Tilford Le Cheminant remond tw 
fragments of metal from the deceased (Tr. 433). Tl, 
metal fragments were shipped to the Federal Bureau" 
Im·estigation and Richard J. Poppleton, a special 
for the F. B. I., identified the fragments as rifle 
l\ir. Poppleton stated that the two slugs had the 
characteristics as some bullets which he tested from 
.22 calibre rifle that had been loaned to the dc('r11>1 
and which was State's 22 (Tr. 563). 
La Var Hall testified that he went to the rcsidcm· 
of Ken Hall on N onmher G, 1965. He testified th: 
while at the residence of Ken Hall he saw Roy p,. 
the defendant in these proceedings. La Var Hall 
fied that he was indehted to Ken Hall and that 011 ti 
6th of ovember, 19G5, he ga,·e Ken Hall $23.00 fnr 
freezer (Tr. 262, 26-t.). Eldon Hafen testified tlrnt K·· 
neth Hall came i11to his store kno\\·n as the 0. K Tir 
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in 8t. George, Utah, some time in the afternoon of 
:\unmhcr G, HlG:J. I\1r. Hafen stated that Roy Poe was 
11itli K!'n Hall at the time he came to the store provided, 
J1mrcrer, that Poe did not come into the store . 
. \!irkl·>· Clark testified that at the time Ken Hall was in 
thr store of Eldon Hafen that he, Mickey Clark, had a 
<'omwsation with Roy Poe outside of the Tire Store. 
Clark testified that Roy Poe asked to borrow 
tl0.00 so that he could visit his relatives in Las Vegas, 
Xernda (rl'r. 283). Irwin Pace testified that Ken Hall 
nm! Roy Poe were in the Sun Bowl Club at St. George, 
rt ah, on November 6, 1965, between 9 :30 and 10 :00 P. 
\L Irwin Pace also testified that Ken Hall gave him a 
ri<le home in his 1957 Plymouth Station Wagon on No-
\'cmbt>r G, 1965. He indicated that Ken Hall dropped 
him off at about 10 :15 to 10 :18 P. l\L (Tr. 300). 
Vern Phillips testified that Roy Poe was m the 
Bowl Club on the same evening and that he, Roy 
Poe, sold him two rifles, one of which was a .22 calibre 
(Exhibit No. 22) (Tr. 830). The witness then pro-
<'cPcle<l to give some conflicting evidence as to the con-
dnd of the defendant. 
David Holtz testified that Roy Poe came into the 
sfls station where he was 'vorking near St. George, Utah, 
Ht approximately 11 :30 P. 1\1. Nonmber (), 19G5 (Tr. 
l\Ir. Holtz testified that he filled the car :Mr. Poe 
1' dri \'ing· with g·as and overheard Poe cliscussing 
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something about his going to Las Vegas, Nevada (Tr 
700, 703). 
Gerald Hickey, a Las V cgas, police ofti 
cer, testified that he arrested Roy Lee Poe in Las 
N eYada (Tr. 509). The defendant waived extradition 
and the following day was transferred from Las 
NeYada to St. George, lltah by bheriff E\-an \Vhitehra1l 
of the vVashington County Sheriff's Office. 
During the trial the prosecution introduced senral 
pictures of the deceased. The initial use of the pl10tu- 1 
graphs was to establish identity of the deceased a111J 
was not in dispute. However, the prosecution c011tinuP1l 
to introduce the photographs and to exhibit the :;ame 
to each and witness. On each occasion the proie· 
cution emphasized the blood on the victim as well a'· 
surrounding the ,-ictim on the 1rnll and bed coveriug. 
The defendant did not dispute that the deceased had bcei: 
shot twice in the head and died from the wounds. The 
photographs established these facts upon the first prr' , 
entation of the same and the repeated presentation anti 
efforts by the prosecution to review the cxhihits time 
and time again with each witness, over the objection of 
the defense, were unrelated to the culpability of the al'· 
cused if guilty and were inflammatory. 
Byron Lee \Vulffenstein, a witness called hy th<' 
defense, testified that Roy Poe, Kenneth Hall and ).!r. 
Wulffenstein, together with Mr. ·\Vulffrnstein'R larl: 
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friend, ·were together on the night of November 6, 1965, 
until near 10 :00 P. 1\1. 
J oReph Dean Anderson was called as a witness for 
the defense and testified that he was a friend of Roy 
Lee Poe and that on the enning of Friday, November 5, 
1%5, ::\Ir. Poe \Vas present with him in the Sun Bowl Club 
at St. George, tTtah (Tr. 896, 897). Mr. Anderson fur-
ther testified that he had a conversation with Mr. Poe 
about selling some guns. Mr. Anderson testified that 
i\Ir. Poe had a conversation with Mr. Vern Phillips and 
left the Sun Bowl Club with Mr. Phillips, later return-
mg. 
Mr. Dean Anderson testified that he was present 
with the defendant, Roy Lee Poe, on Saturday, Novem-
ber 6, 19G5 around 10 :00 to 10 :30 P. M. (Tr. 900). That 
he, Roy Poe, and others remained in the Sun Bowl Club 
at St. George, Utah, until around 11 :00 P .M. Mr. An-
derson further testified that they went from the Sun 
Bowl Cln b to a place known as Pete's ·wagon Wheel 
(Tr. 90:i). Mr . .Anderson then testified that the group 
drove from St. George, Utah, west toward Nevada. Mr. 
Anderson testified that he became ill somewhere along 
the road and that they were required to stop. He tes-
tified that he recalls that Mr. Poe was in the group at 
thr time they stopped and was also in the group at the 
time arriYed in Mesquite, NeYada (Tr. 906). He 
fnrihPr t<>stifi0<1 that l\Ir. Poe was left in Mesquite and 
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<lid not return to St. George with the rest of tlw group 
The defendant, Roy Lee Poe, took the witness slaitll 
and testified in his own defense. He testified that hi 
did in fact know the deceased and that he and the clr·. 
ceased had worked together on a job se\-eral days prior 
to the 6th of November, 1_96;). He further teRtificd tha: 
on Friday evening, the 5th of November, 19G5, that 111 
saw the deceased 's two rifles in the hack of the r1r·. 
ceased's car when he had it to the gas station to chert 
the tires. He admitted that he then took the two riflf', 1 
on that same Friday night and sold them to 2\[r. Yem 
Phillips (Tr. 968). 
It is important to note that other of tlw 
State's witnesses indicated that there was a question as 
to whether the said rifles were in the deceased 's hom1, 
on Saturday the 6th. 
Mr. Poe testified that he spent the day of Satnr<la.1. 
November 6th, with :Mr. Hall and during the evening oi 
that day they took their evening meal with l\fr. B.nou 1 
Lee Wulffenstein and his lady friend \Yanda. He theu 
stated that after the eYening meal that he showed bis 
friends how to bone ont a deer. Late in the 
after 10 :00 P. M., he testified that he and Mr. Hall 
went to the Sun Bowl Club (Tr. 970-975). He last ER\\ 
his friend, Mr. Hall, when he departed with l\Ir. Pare 
Mr. Poe Jater left the Sun Bowl Club with his frienil 
Mr. Dean Anderson and a couple of other fellows. They. 
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purchased more htJer and after gomg for a short visit 
to another bar or rlnb left for Mesquite, Nevada (Tr. 
97;J-978). He wa8 invoked in a fight in Mesquite right 
after they arrind and testified that he obtained a 
room for the night and did not return to St. George 
with his friends (r_f'r. 979). He explained to Dr. Mc-
Gregor when he was examined after his arrest that he 
was hurt in a fight and this was substantiated by Dr . 
.\IcGregor 's testimony and report (Tr. 389-395). Mr. 
Poe denied that he was involved in any way with the 
death of 1\Ir. Hall, his friend (Tr. 983). 
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE COMPOSITION OF JURY 
The record reflects that the defendant, Roy Lee 
Poe, was completely unknown by every membe_r of the 
jury including the members of the potential jury panel. 
The record further establishes that almost every po-
tential juror and particularly the jurors making up the 
jury were acquainted with the attorneys for the prose-
cution and were acquainted with many of the witnesses 
ealled for the state. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Trial Court Committed Prejudicial Error by Refusing 
to Allow the Defendant's Counsel to Determine by Direct 
Voir Dire Examination or by Voir Dire Examination of the 
Court the Answers to Questions as to the Religion and Re-
10 
ligious Attitudes of the Prospective Jurors and also the 
Method of Selecting Additional Veniremen, Thereby Denying' 
the Defendant Due Process of Law Under the Constitution 
of the United States, Amendment XIV. 
Prior to the selection of the final Jury panel tlw 
defendant, by and through his counsel, requested that 
the Court individually voir dire each prospective juror 
and determine their religion and also determine as !n 
whether or not by virtue of their religion they had es-
tablished a moral or religious attitude regarding the 1 
death sentence in first degree murder cases (Tr. 61). 
The Court refused to allo\v the extended voir dire re-
quested by the defendant (Tr. 70). The case of TVitl1er-
spoon v. Illinois, 291 U. 8. 510, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 
2d 776 holds that a jury from which veniremen , 
moral or religious scruples against capital punishment 
are excluded falls short of that impartiality to which 
a defendant is entitled nnder the Sixth and FourtPentl1 
Amendments. In the instant case the Court refused to 
1 
allow the defendant the right to determine the religion; 
scruples and attitudes of the prospective jury members. 
Courts are generally agreed that the jurors may hr 
interrogated on voir dire as to whether prejudice exists 
which is based on racial, religious, economic, social or 
political prejudices. Courts almost universally hold tha! 
such prejudices may be proper subject of inquiry, enu 
though, if established, might not afford gronnd for chnl· 
I 
11 
]enge for cause. However, this allows the defense to 
rea:,;onably and properly evaluate the prospective jurors 
and to exercise an intelligent and meaningful preempt-
ive challenge based upon knowledge gained from this 
inquiry. 
The Court refused on request in chambers of de-
fense counsel to dismiss Mr. George Milton Sealey, a 
prospective juror (Tr. 63). Mr. Sealey was a special 
deputy for a law enforcement agency in Southern Utah 
and as such admitted to attending various schools, 
holding himself out as a member of the law enforcement 
group in Southern Utah or in Iron County. Had the 
Court dismissed l\Ir. Sealey for cause the defendant 
would have been able to make a more meaningful use of 
his preemptive challenges. 
The Court erred in directing the Deputy Sheriff 
in Iron County, Utah to pro-.;ide six (6) additional jur-
ors (Tr. 100). 8r:ction 77-28-1 of the Utah Code Anno-
tated provides that juries for criminal trials are formed 
in the same manner as provided in U.R.C.P. 47 (g). 
Utah Code Annotated 78-46-23 provides that if addi-
tional trial jurors are necessary, additional names shall 
Le drawn from the box; but if, in the judgment of the 
Court, the attendance of any drawn from the box can-
not he obtained, they may be laid aside and other names 
11rawn. "If all names become exhausted at any term, 
the .Tndµ;0 mn>· order an open venire for such number 
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of jurors as he deems necessary, who shall be summoned 
to serve.'' 
It is clear that the Judge failed to follow the re-
quirements of the Utah Code Annotated as above 5et 
forth in selecting the additional jurors. The proper 
procedure was to draw the additional names from 111,. 
jury venire previously prepared and drawn for the 
county for the existing term of court. However, Judge 
Day in the instant case directed Mr. Hyatt Bentley, the 
Deputy Sheriff, to obtain six (6) additional jurorn from 
streets and businesses of Parowan, Utah. Counsel for 
the defendant properly objected to this procedure (Tr. 
134). 
In State 'VS. Cluff, 158 Pac. 705, the Court hel<l that 
under the existing statutes of the State of Utah the 
venire of jurors for the term must first be exhausted 
by drawing additional names from the box containing 
all veniremen. The names of jurors not readily acces-
sible because they reside at a distance may properly 
be laid aside and other names drawn. 
It was an error to disregard the requirements of 
the Utah Code and to direct the Deputy Sheriff to go 
into the Parowan area and obtain the six (6) additional 
prospective jurors to complete the jury panel. 
Glasser 'VS. United States, 315 U. 8. 60, 62 S. ri. 
4.57, 86 L. Ed. 680, held, 
t t'n ''A jury should he a body truly represen a 1 
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of the community or the district from which it is 
to be chosen. There must not be conditions which 
lead Courts or officials into selections of juries 
or jurymen which do not comport with the concept 
of the jury as a cross-section of the community 
from which it is chosen.'' 
Paro·wan, Utah, the county seat of Iron County, Utah 
is a small community of appro.ximately 1500 people. Iron 
County, the general area from which the jury venire is 
drawn, comprises a much larger area and has a popula-
tion in excess of 10,000 people. The Court was in error 
to arbitrarily assume that the persons selected from the 
small community of Parowan immediately near the court 
house would be truly representative of the district from 
which the jury venire is chosen. 
The Utah Court has held in the State of Utah vs. 
Dodge, 365 P. 2d 798, 12 Utah 2d 293, that 
''The constitutional right to trial by jury is 
the right to trial by a fair and impartial jury, 
drawn from the cross-section of the community." 
People rs. lVliitc, 278 P. 2d 9, 43 C. 2d 740, supports 
the general rule with the following comments: 
''Trial by jury necessarily contemplates an 
impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the 
community and selected by court officials 'vithout 
systematic and intentional exclusion of any of 
these g;roups.'' 
The ('ase of People 1'S. Carter, 364 P. 2d 477, 56 C. 2d 
G49, set forth on pag·e 489 thereof that the proper method 
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of selection of jury is by alphabet with no reference 1 
address and goes on to infer that there should he no HI 
tempt to exclude any geographical segment of the eoun 
ty's population. 
In the instant case the method used by the court in 
directing the deputy sheriff to obtain additional jurnr, 
in the Parowan area \Vas, in fact, a calculated and clirrr' 
means of geographically eliminating persons who were, 
in fact, subject to jury senice that resided elsewhere iu 
Iron County, 
It seems abundantly clear that the court should haw 
recessed the proceedings and directed the County Clerk 
and other Jury Commissioners to draw from the jur: 
venire the prospectin jury panel to supplement the ex-
isting· jury panel. During- the late afternoon hours, eYe-
ning and morning· prior to trial on the following dale 
the Sheriff and/or other process servers could have a<lc· 
quately and timely sened the prospective members with· 
in the county and required their appearance as 
pective jurors. Contrarywise, the court disregarded 
this requirement and indulged in a method of obtaining 
six (6) prospective jurors in a manner which was prejmli-
cial to the defendant. The jurors came from the small 
community of Parowan where the trial was being held 
and there was a greater opportunity for prospectirr' 




The Trial Court Committed Prejudicial Errer by Admission 
of Testimony from Prior Trial 
Utah Code Annotated 77-44-3 provides that when tes-
timony in prior hearing has been transcribed by official 
Court Reporter and thereafter such witness shall die or 
br beyond the jurisdiction of the court, either party may 
read in evidence the testimony of such witness, when duly 
certified by the reporter to be correct, in any subsequent 
trial, subject only to the same objections that might be 
made if such witness were on the stand and testifying in 
open court. (Emphasis added). 
In the case of State vs. Kazda, 320 P. 2d 486, 15 Ut. 
2d 313, the court held that a witness who was outside of 
the state is "beyond the jurisdiction of the court." It 
provided, howeYer, that there must be a showing that the 
witness is in fact beyond the jurisdiction of the court. In 
the instant case, there was much testimony introduced by 
the various witnesses in behalf of the prosecution to es-
tablish that certain witnesses were outside the jurisdic-
tion of the court. The testimony so provided failed to 
show that a due, diligent and proper search had been 
made to determine if the persons were in fact outside of 
the jurisdiction of the court. The court ruled on at 
least two occasions during the proceedings that the tes-
timony provided regarding the unavailability of Lewis 
P. Lagana nR a witness before the court in these pro-
16 
ceedings was inadequate. However, the court grantr:ii 
the state and prosecution time within which to make i 11 
additional search and recessed for these purposes. 
It appears that the general rnle in such cases is 1r1 
forth in Corp11s .Juris 8crnndum, Ecide11cc, Scclio11 39,; 
which indicates that due diligence must be proven. 1'ha1 
is to say, due diligence must be shown on the part 111 
the sheriff and/or other authorities seeking the wher"· 
abouts of the ·witness and that due diligence is so estab 
lished when there is an issuance of snbpeonas and tlw 
, delivery of the same to the sheriff and a search for th, 
witness with a return of the subpeonas shmving an eu 
dorsement by the sheriff that the witness could not ],, 
found. 
·A review of the evidence of the parties 
regarding their efforts· to locate Le,.,·is P. Lagana aml 
. also Mary Miner clearly establishes that due diligenc 1' 
was not in fact exercised to locate the said witm•sscs. 
Jones on Evidence, in S ectinns 313 and 314, indi-
cates that the seriousness of a criminal matter hai 
prompted some courts to hold that testimony produced 
' at earlier trials may not be admitted even when the 
witness is shown to be dead. However, there are author· 
ities which hold that the proper procedure is to take the 
deposition of the witness if he can be fonnd anfl tluit 
· the mere absence from the state is not one of the ground> 
for admitting testimony which has be0n tak<>n at n for 
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mer trial. 
In the case of Long vs. California-TV estern States 
Life l11suro11ce Co., 279 P.2d 43, 43 C. 2d 871, the court 
infers that the stamlard of "due diligence" might be 
that there be nnse1Ted subpeonas returned by constables 
along with information that witnesses are deceased or 
that the witness is in a foreign state. 
In the instant case the testimony of Clark Robinson 
(Tr. 742), Harry l\IcCoy (Tr. 750) and Evan G. White-
head (Tr. 7GO) clearly show that certain efforts were 
made to establish the whereabouts of the witnesses La-
gana and proYided, howeYer, the testimony clear-
ly establishes that no effort whatsoever was made to 
check employment records, Social Security records, pos-
tal authority records, former friends and associates and 
wch persons as could reasonably be clothed with any 
knowledge whatsoenr about the whereabouts of said 
witnesses. 
The <lefemlant is prejudiced by lack of opportunity 
to cross-examine the \Yitnesses whose testimony is al-
lowed to be read before the jury. The right to observe 
the attitlHle, expression and demeanor of the witnesses, 
both hy the defendant, his eonnsel and particularly by 
tlw jury, iR an integral part and a necessary aspect of 
the trial proceedings. To han the testimony read to 
the .inry without the opportunity to observe these char-
a<'1(·risti('s of the witness and without the opportunity 
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of proper cross-examination is prejudicial to the defonrl 
;mt in such proceedings. 
There is a reasonable inference hy an 
jury that the testimony from previous hearings wliitli 
is read into the record indicates a conviction at the pre 
vious trial and a re1:ersnl on a technicality. It is reN1 
able to assume that an intelligent jury would ll!ld0r 
stand and know that a person 1rn11lc1 not be tried hl1c1 
for the same crime and that, had the previous trial rt 
snlted in an acquittal, the matter would haYe been con 
eluded at that point. it is reasonable !hit 
the jury would assume that, if there were in fact tran' 
cripts of a previous hearing and trial, the defendant 
must have been convicted at the previous trial and that 
the matter as presented is a retrial. This 
which must be emphasized as reasonable, is prejudici:1! 
to the defendant and is prompted by the use of 
trial transcripts. 
POINT III 
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Admitting Into 
Evidence Gruesome and Gory Pictures of the Deceased When 
Discovered with the Inflammatory Nature and Prejudicial 
Effects of Such Photographs Overshadowed Any Possible 
Probative Value with Respect to a Fact in Issue. 
\Vhen photographs or demonstratiYe eYidence nrr 
offered into evidence for a demonstration to the jnrY. 
· f]arn their admissibility depends npon whether t11c lll ' 
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matorY nature of such evidence is outweighed by their 
proLati,-e rnlue with respect to a fact in issue. See 
Stofc nf Utah cs. Poe, 21 Ut. 2d 113, 441 P. 2d 512 
(1968), rwd State 11/ f 7 fah cs. Renzo, 21 Ut. 2d 205, 443 
P. 2rl 392 (1uD1:1). 
Exhibits 8 and 9 as offered by the prosecution and 
admitted into evidence by the court (Tr. 199) were black 
and white pictures of the deceased as found by his 
lJrother, Leland Hall, and the police officers. The pic-
tures were elose-nps of the deceased's upper body show-
ing the blood on his head, on the bedding, and upon the 
·wall near the \·ictim. Counsel for Defendant-Appellant 
fails to see the purpose or rele\-all.ce of the admitted 
pictures. No one enr disputed the fact that the de-
ceased person was Kenneth Hall nor the fact that his 
life was taken by gunshot \rnunds to the head. There 
11as ne\'er any question of the <leceased 's death or its 
cause. o one questioned the identity of the deceased. 
There was no fact in issue that these pictures would 
ltelp thP jury soh·e. Thus, there was no purpose served 
by the admission of the photographs other than to in-
flame tlip jnrors' emotions. 
rnie trial eourt abnsed its discretion by admitting 
the pictnres o\·er the proper objections of defendant's 
c·onnsel ('J'r. :200). Defendant-Appellant submits that 
1lie inflammatory nature and rirejudicial effect of such 
Jihoto,'.(raplts OYorshadowed an:;· possible probative value 
with respect to the fact in issue, therefore 110t safo: 
ing the test that the Ctah Conrt has proposed i11 ti" 
Poe and Renzo cases. 
POINT IV 
The Trial Court Committed Prejudicial Error by Requirin: 
the Jury to Retire and Consider Their Verdict at Such a Lat1 
Hour in the Day and by Refusing to Allow the Jury to b1 
Taken to an Appropriate and Proper Place to Retire for tht 
Evening, to Return the Following Day and Continue Thei: 
Deliberations. 
The record of these proceedings will f'hO\Y (T1 
1,063) that the jnr:: retired to consider their wrdirt n· 
7 :38 P. l\L This was during the e\·ening hours of tb1 
sixth full and long (lay of trial proceedings. Xnmernu· 
exhibits had been introduced in the proceedings and arl 
mittecl by the court for the jury's consideration. 11 
was obYious that it would take seYeral hours to rerie" 
the exhibits, consider the material and e\·alnatc the t'<iel· 
and circumstances surrounding the case. The cour 
erred in charging the jury with the responsihilitY 1' 
considering the Yerdict at such a late honr on the dati· 
and further erred in refusing to order the jun· to h 
taken to a proper place and he allowed to retire for !Ji,, 
night and return the following· morning to further con 
sider the verdict. 
At the hour of approximately :45 A. l\I., after 81'1 
eral hours of delihcration, the bailiff' charg·ccl with 1111 
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rcsponsihility of carmg for the jury during their delib-
erations mh·ised the court that the jury had some ques-
1ions reganling the penalties for co1ffiction of murder. 
The Itrst question: '' \Yhat would be the maximum pen-
alt,1· for second degree mnrder?'' The second question: 
"What wonlcl he the maximum penalty for first degree 
m1m1er and, the third question: ''If first degree mur-
der is our cleri,.,ion, with leniency, when would he, 'Mr. 
Po1;', he eligihle for parole?" (Tr. 1,066). 
The conrt erretl in not allowing the jury to be 
taken to a proper place to retire and rest prior to con-
tinning· their deliberations. The court erred in over-
ruling the objection (Tr. 1,057-8, 1,073) of the defend-
ant rrganlinµ; the allowance of the jury to proceed with 
their deliberations at such a late hour when it was ob-
rions that they "·ere Yery tired. 
In the rase of Cn11'pcrtl11rnite rs. Jones (Ct. Com. Pl. 
Pl1ilarl1lz;liia). 2 Dall . .5!), 1 Jj, Ed. 287, the Court held 
"a 1ww trial shonlcl he held for actual and manifest in-
.instiC'c done." In the Olass!'r rs. United States case, 
supra, the Conrt held that the right to a jury trial em-
hrarPs thr right to a proper trial. The Court said: 
"Where scales of justice are delicately poised 
het\\'rrn µ;nilt and innocence, error, which under 
somr cirrnmstances w01ilc1 not be grounds for re-
wrsal, cannot lw hrnshed asicle as immaterial. The 
TJl'Op0r .inry mnst he an impartial and objective 
rross s0ction from the community from "·hich it 
is cliosPn. '' 
It is apparent that the .inry, lmrclenecl with 1] 10 C·i 
haustion of six days of trial, bu rdenecl with 1 he concrr
11 
of their family affairs at home, am1 burdened wi1h ti 
lateness of the honr, conlcl not Le <1 proper .inry. C'r·r 
tainly exhaustion and the limitation of the physic:1! bod' 
fnnctions as well as the mental limitation hrong-ht ahmi' 
because of the physical weak0nin2; of the as a rr> 
sult of long and late hours, shoulcl he considered as an 
outside or external influence on the jury. In the case m 
Remmer i-s. United 8tate8, 350 8. 377, 76 8. Ct. 42.i. 
100 L. Ed. 43.5, the Conrt held "It is the law's ohjecfor· 
to guard jealously the sanctity of the jnry 's right j,, 
operate as as possible from outside or external 
influence.'' 
It is easy to see from the record in these procerd 
ings that the jury was not able to freely operate hecall'" 
of the pressures of exhaustion brought on by the lnk 
ness of the hour. 
In Xenakis 1·s. Garrett Frri9ht Lines, 2G.5 I'. 211 
1007, 1 Ut. 2d 299, the Court held: 
''It would seem unwise, in Yiew of all of th1 
effort that goes into a suit, the timr ancl rn 
ergy extended upon the pleadings, the 
tion of facts, the procurement of witnesses and 
other evidence, and the use of seycral ot 
trial, to then submit a cause to a jnn· at '1 
late hour that they may feel nnder compulswn 111 
the pressure of or. other consiclerations,.whicl; 
would prevent thorn from making n fnll. fall' 11111• 
dispassionate analysis and determination of the 
mattrrs 011trusted to their judgment." 
\\Tith the seriousness attending a case wherein the 
charge is first degree murder, it seems that the above 
.set forth rule of the Utah Court would apply even more 
in the in1-Jtant case than in the case cited. 
The Utah Court reviewed this point m other pro-
ccctlings, including- the case of Hanks 1'8. Christiansen, 
3:;4 £>. ::rl :J64, 11 r·t. 2d 8. The Hanks case recognizes 
the authority of the trial judge to use a wide latitude 
of discretion. IIoweYer, where his determinations are 
pnrely arbitrary, unreasonable and prejudicial to the 
objecting party there are grounds for reversal. In the 
instaut case, the trial judge was in fact arbitrary and 
umcasonable abont the requirement that the jury stay 
and consider the issues involnd in the complicated mat-
ter at such a late hour. This requirement was clearly 
prcjndicial to the defendant, who objected to the same. 
POINT V 
The Cumulative Effect of the Foregoing Errors Deprived 
the Appellant of a Fair Trial. 
It is the position of the defendant that each of the 
heretofore presented is sufficient ground upon 
which thiR C1onrt should reYerse the trial court judgment 
and gTant th0 app0llant a n0w trial. HoweYer, should 
'.lir C'onrt hold against the appellant on each of these 
it shonl(l keep in mill(l the responsibility that 
the Court has to "scrntinizc "·ith care> the propriet)· 11 
all aspects of the proceedings.'' ,C.,'fnfl' n.;. St. Clair, .1 r: 
2d 230, :282 P. 2d 323 (1955 ). 
In State cs. rnsqzu.::, 101 l'foh 444, 121 Pac. !111. 
(1942) the Conrt recogniz0c1 that there may he 
errors in a trial ancl each error standing al011r> wil1 n1· 
be sufficiently prejudicial to merit a reYersal, hnt 1Yhe1 
each error is reYiewed in conjnnction with the otJi,, 
errors the cumulati,·e effect amount to th(' denin: 
of a fair trial. 
If the Court will bnt reYiew the record and circum· 
stances the trial of Hoy L0e Poe it will 11 
apparent that the oYerall effect of the proceedings prt 
vented the appellant from receiYing· a fair and ju< 
trial. The e,·idence hefore the jnry was purely circum 
stantial evidence. The State failed to prow that th1 
weapons introduced as Exhibits were in fact the weap· 
ons which contributed in way to the death of tlw 
defendant. The State failed to proYe that the clefellil 
ant Hoy Lee Poe had any motiYe whafa.;oenr for th' 
killing of Mr. Kenneth Hall, a person who had befrien11 
ed him and taken him into his home. 
The defendant was in an area where he had 11 ·' 
friends whatsoever to come to his aid and r<'scne Ir; 
testifying on his behalf or by assisting him in any wa: 
The defendant had spent the previous :-;everal in 
.. of - iii tri:i! 
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the incarceration pending the second trial and his in-
carceration during the trial. 
The fact that the murder in 1965 had been a sensa-
tional murder in the small town of St. George, Utah, 
with the victim of the crime a life-time resident in the 
community apparently left the entire Southern Utah 
area 1Yith an impression that the "outsider" Mr. Roy 
Lee Poe, the defendant herein, was the only obvious sus-
pect. The record is absolutely clear that no efforts 
whatever were made to investigate the crime to deter-
mine the actual facts and circumstances except such 
facts, evidence and circumstances that could be uncov-
Pred and directed toward Mr. Roy Lee Poe. 
From the absence of proof on the part of the State 
to show a mofo·e for the brutal killing, from the ab-
sence on the part of the State to associate the defendant 
in any direct manner with the crime by fingerprints or 
other direct eYidence, and from the fact that the entire 
Southern Utah area had a general attitude that the de-
fendant was guilty prior to eYen his first trial and cer-
tainly more so after his second trial and after the many 
court hearings held between the first trial and second 
trial iu an effort to insure the defendant proper repre-
sentation, and from the errors of the court as heretofore 
set forth, it is submitted that under the rule of State vs. 
St. C'lr1ir antl the other cases with similar holdings, this 
2G 
Court should remand this case hack to the District ('0111 
for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH E. JACKSON' 
CLINE, JACKSON & J 
Attnrncys for Apprl/111 
